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
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
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LEBANON

Fighting is continuing in Beirut's hotel district and the nearby mountains as Kamal Jumblatt and other Lebanese leftists resist pressure from Syria to agree to a cease-fire.

Jumblatt today reiterated his demand that President Franjiyah step down before the leftists will agree to a truce. According to press reports, Franjiyah submitted his resignation to the Maronite patriarch several days ago for use when there was a political agreement on his successor.

Jumblatt also publicly criticized the Syrians for cutting off arms and ammunition to the leftists. Both Jumblatt and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat have been under increasing pressure from Damascus to accept a truce.

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The US defense attache in Tel Aviv reported that Israel probably will implement some form of mobilization very quickly if it perceives a direct threat from Syria. Israeli aircraft again flew several reconnaissance missions over southern Lebanon yesterday.

So far, Tel Aviv does not seem to be overly concerned about recent military measures taken by Syria. Israel has said publicly, however, that it will have to "take steps" if Damascus openly sends regular army units into Lebanon.

According to the defense attache, the Israelis are aware of the heightened Syrian alert status and they have noticed an increase in Syrian ground reconnaissance of the Israeli-Syrian border. They do not, however, believe it is directed against Israel.

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TURKEY

Deputy Prime Minister Turkes asserted in a press interview on Monday that by historical right all the Aegean Islands within 50 kilometers of the Turkish coast—almost all of which are Greek controlled—should belong to Turkey. This is bound to fuel the growing controversy over the Aegean.

As a possible solution to the problems between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean, he proposed that the sea be divided equally between the two countries along a north-south line.

It is not clear whether Turkes' remarks reflect his own extreme brand of nationalism or the consensus of the shaky Turkish coalition. Turkes may simply have been taking a position with popular appeal to benefit his small, right-wing National Action Party.

In the context of the on-going UN Law of the Sea conference, however, Turkes' claims could be viewed as part of the government's efforts to head off any agreements that would affect the Turkish position in the Aegean. Turkes said in this connection that Turkey could not accept an extension of the Greek territorial seas to 12 miles.

Turkes' linkage of the opposition Republican People's Party to the cession of the islands to Greece after World War II also suggests that his statements might have been coordinated with Prime Minister Demirel. Leaders of the Republican People's Party have lashed out recently at alleged inaction by the government in defending Turkish rights in the Aegean.

Official reaction in Athens to this new element in the Aegean equation is likely to be sober and measured, although it will add to Greek apprehensions over the recently signed Turkish-US defense agreement. The Greek press is certain to play Turkes' interview as an ominous warning of Turkey's real intentions.



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ZAIRE

In recent weeks the Zairian government has sought to identify itself more clearly with radical positions on southern African issues. At the same time, criticism of Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola has given way to warnings to all major powers to stay out of southern Africa.

The new tack reflects President Mobutu's desire to work his way back into the mainstream of the African nationalist movement following the failure of his intervention in Angola. He also wants to avoid being left in the isolated position of having to oppose publicly a possible Soviet and Cuban role—should it come to that—in forcing majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Mobutu strongly endorsed Mozambican President Machel's decision early this month to close his country's border with Rhodesia, and he has promised material assistance to the Machel regime. Before the Rhodesian settlement talks collapsed, Zaire's controlled news media became increasingly critical of black nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo's efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement with Ian Smith, and implicitly endorsed guerrilla war.

Mobutu, who has never had any difficulty adapting to changing circumstances, has concluded that he can no longer continue the outspoken hostility that he had specifically directed toward Moscow and Havana during the Angolan conflict.

These overtures do not mean that Mobutu is any less distrustful of Soviet and Cuban intentions in southern Africa—and toward Zaire in particular. High Zairian officials have indicated the regime's continuing concern on this score in contacts with the US embassy in Kinshasa. The officials indicated that Zaire's more militant public posture would be paralleled by discreet, private support for moderate solutions in Rhodesia and Namibia that would preempt any future Soviet and Cuban involvement.

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BULGARIA

The 11th Bulgarian party congress, which opened in Sofia on Monday and will continue through April 2, is proceeding at a measured pace.

Because Bulgaria is Moscow's staunchest ally in Eastern Europe, the congress is mirroring the themes of stability, continuity, and progress which pervaded the Soviets' recent 25th party congress. Party boss Zhivkov, in the opening address, stressed the necessity for "socialist" states to observe the guidelines of Marxism-Leninism and "proletarian internationalism"—a phrase connoting Soviet leadership of the world communist movement.

In a brief foreign policy review, Zhivkov emphasized Sofia's "principled and constructive" Balkan policy, but accused "certain imperialist NATO circles assisted by the Maoists" of attempting to undermine improved regional ties. Following a precedent set at the Soviet party congress, the Bulgarian leader sharply attacked the Chinese saying the "degradation of Maoism has reached a new phase" of hostility to Marxism-Leninism. Zhivkov also urged all communist parties to cooperate to resolve their differences "in a comradely manner," while maintaining a close alliance with Moscow.

Zhivkov, taking a cue from his Soviet mentors, strongly condemned anti-Sovietism, and pledged Bulgaria's support to national liberation movements. In an acknowledgment of the leadership's concern with ideological apathy, Zhivkov also asserted that the exchange of party cards, scheduled to take place following the congress, does not violate his party's principles and norms of behavior.

Despite reports that General Secretary Brezhnev would travel to Sofia, the USSR is represented by Politburo member and Party Secretary Fedor Kulakov. In a speech to the Sofia gathering, Kulakov said that the relaxation of tensions has now become a "leading tendency" in foreign affairs. Kulakov criticized Western politicians who question this trend and call for international relations to be conducted from positions of strength.

East European party leaders in attendance include Kadar of Hungary, Husak of Czechoslovakia, and Gierek of Poland. Notably absent are President Ceausescu of Romania, who is in Kuwait, and Yugoslav President Tito, who is in Sweden.

A matter likely to receive great attention during the congress is Bulgaria's economic performance and its next five-year plan. Emphasis is expected to be placed on increased productivity and efficiency as the necessary precursors to an improved standard of living. On Friday, elections to the Central Committee and Politburo will be held, but no major changes in the party hierarchy are anticipated.

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FOR THE RECORD

UK: The British Labor Party failed again to elect a new leader in the second round of balloting announced on March 30. Foreign Secretary Callaghan, however, is certain to be the winner after the next ballot is counted on April 5. Callaghan moved into the top position in the second round of voting by winning 141 votes, followed by Michael Foot, the leftist employment secretary, with 133. Chancellor of the Exchequer Healey, who finished last with a disappointing 38 votes, was automatically eliminated. Almost all of Healey's supporters are likely to back Callaghan in the next and final round of voting.

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ANNEX

ETHIOPIAN AND SOMALI MILITARY STRENGTHS

On paper, Ethiopia is stronger militarily than Somalia. Its 40,000-man army is about twice as large as Somalia's, and the 10,000-man paramilitary police force could assist the army in a war. Addis Ababa has also recalled several thousand veterans to help deal with the Eritrean rebels in the north and is forming another military unit for a counterinsurgency role.

Ethiopia's air force is primarily a ground attack force equipped mostly with US-manufactured aircraft, including 20 F-5s and 16 obsolescent F-86 jet fighters. The first of 16 new F-5Es are scheduled to arrive sometime next month.

Ethiopia's armed forces have declined in combat capability over the past year as a result of the disarray in the chain of command and a general lack of discipline. According to the US defense attache, the atmosphere of suspicion in the country stifles initiative and leadership. Very little training is being conducted in the army.

Ethiopia's ability to fight a war with Somalia is severely hampered by the domestic insurgencies that tie down much of the army in Eritrea and other provinces. Addis Ababa has given highest priority to the insurgencies and has even sent troops to Eritrea from the Ogaden, which borders on Somalia.

Even though the government diverts supplies to the north at the expense of the forces along the Somali border, troops in the north continue to have logistic problems and vehicle shortages. The supply situation is more severe along the Somali border, however, where a lack of vehicles and the long distances lead to fuel and food shortages. The supply lines in the Ogaden would be vulnerable to interdiction in the event of a war.

Along the border, the balance is more favorable to Somalia. Mogadiscio has several units in position to move to the border, and only one Ethiopian infantry division and two tank battalions could counter quickly any Somali move into either the Ogaden or the FTAI.

The Somali army is a 22,000-man force organized into four divisions and may be forming another. One division is in the north, with units near Hargeisa and Berbera. Two tank battalions also are in the north. Two other army divisions are in the south, along the two main roads between Mogadiscio and the Ethiopian border; the fourth division, which is understrength, is in the central border area near Galcaio.

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
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The loss of Djibouti would deprive Ethiopia of its railhead on the sea. Addis Ababa would have no more than an even chance of dislodging the Somalis from Djibouti. An invasion would require the Ethiopians to give up the campaigns against insurgents in the north at least temporarily.

It is probable that a shooting war in the FTAI would also lead to one in the Ogaden area. The Somalis could also gain some territory there before meeting enough Ethiopian resistance to be stopped. Neither side, however, has a good enough supply system to maintain an offensive in the Ogaden for more than a few weeks.



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